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Abstract
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolution.
Based solely on group signals, we dene a player's group reputation as the
belief that others have about the characteristics of the group the player belongs
to. A model of group reputation of civil servants with anonymous matching
and external monitoring is constructed to characterize the strategic behavior
of potential bribers and civil servants, the corresponding levels of corruption,
possible anti-corruption policies, and the eects of these policies. Our results
indicate that as there are two types of corruption behavior of civil servants:
accepting bribes and dereliction of duty, anti-corruption should work along
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... one bad apple spoils the bunch ...
1 Introduction
Reputation matters not only when players want to establish long-term relationship
with others, but also in various one-shot interactions, policy makings, and institu-
tional setups. The issue of individual reputation is well studied. But in the real world,
people often make decisions based on the group reputation of unfamiliar persons. How
does group reputation form and evolve? What eects does group reputation have on
social activities?
The starting point of the reputation model is incomplete information, which in-
duces either adverse selection, moral hazard, or both. Tirole (1996) is the rst attempt
to model the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. Due
to group pooling (individual players' unknown ages and imperfect signals of players'
history records), individual reputations relate to group reputation; and the new mem-
bers may suer from the original sin of their elders. Levin (2001) adopts a similar idea
that a player cannot be perfectly distinguished from others and argues that peers'
past behaviors aect players' record of performance. Both papers focus on individual
reputation and do not clarify the dierence between individual reputation and group
reputation.
A big problem is that one can get a group's reputation with receiving any infor-
mation about a specic individual in the group. In this paper, we dene Individual
Reputation and Group Reputation as follows:
A player Ai's individual reputation to doX with respect to some others
Pj is the belief of Pj on the type or behavior of Ai to do X.
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Group Gk's group reputation to do X with respect to Pj is the belief
of Pj on the type or behavior of any player As 2 Gk, to whom Pj does
not have individual information, to do X.
According to this denition, we divide group Gk into two separate subgroups:
players whom Pj is familiar with (Pj has additional individual signals on these play-
ers), players whom Pj is not familiar with. For players belonging to the rst subgroup,
each player's individual reputation with respect to Pj may vary upon the individual
signals Pj has. But for players belonging to the second subgroup, each player's indi-
vidual reputation with respect to Pj is same as the group reputation because Pj does
not have additional individual signals on these players.
1According to Hardin (1993), trust is a three-part relationship: A trust B to do X. Similarly,
reputation is also a three-part relationship: B's reputation to do X with respect to A is A's belief
on the type or behavior of B to do X.
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For a suciently large group, it is safe to say that there are always some players
within the group unfamiliar to some others Pj. If indeed Pj is familiar with everyone
in a group Gk, we can dene the group reputation of Gk with respect to Pj as follows:
imagining if there were a player who belongs to Gk but Pj does not have individual
information regarding to this player, what is his individual reputation? And this
represents the group reputation.
In other words, a player's group reputation is the belief others have about the char-
acteristics of the player's group, which is based solely on group signals. A player's
individual reputation is derived from his group reputation by adding individual sig-
nals. In this paper, a model of group reputation of civil servants is constructed to
characterize the strategic behavior of potential bribers and civil servants, the cor-
responding levels of corruption, possible anti-corruption policies, and the eects of
these policies.
According to Bardhan (1997), the denition of corruption is \the use of public
oce for private gains, where an ocial (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a
task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private
enrichment which is dicult to monitor for the principal". Most current literature
on corruption focuses on the principal-agent relationship between ocials and the
government, in which the ocials delegate the government to allocate some scarce
resources.
In this paper, we focus on two types of corruption behavior of civil servants:
accepting bribes and dereliction of duty. Civil servants have the right to examine
and approve some project of the private agents by some criteria, such as the road
test for a driver license. The civil servants could belong to the type of \good",
\bad", or \opportunist". The good type always rejects bribes and implements fair
tests. The bad type always accepts bribes and intentionally places obstacles during
the tests if there is no bribe. And the opportunist type will weigh the advantages
and disadvantages to decide whether to accept bribes or intentionally place obstacles
during the tests if there is no bribe. Since a private agent does not know the true
type of a civil servant, he will decide whether or not to oer a bribe according to the
current group reputation of the civil servants.
The reason to focus on these two types of corruption is that bribes accepted by
civil servants are actually \protection money" to prevent them from dereliction of
duty, which is dierent from the \grease money" as in the corruption on allocating
scarce resources. The former is more closely linked to the civilians. And the result
of this type of corruption is much more severe because \protection money" directly
aect the welfare of the civilians. The corruption related to \grease money" only
aect the welfare of the civilians indirectly through embezzling the public resources
by the ocials and the bribers. In some cases, \grease money" even could reduce
the ineciency in public administration. For instance, Lui (1985) argues \the server
could choose to speed up the services when briber is allowed" and as a result the
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outcome is socially optimal.
There are several related strands of literature. The rst is on individual reputation.
Holmstrom (1999) investigates the dynamic incentive problem { the agent has the
strongest incentive to work hard to reveal his managerial ability. As time goes by, his
ability is learned, and thus the reputation eect on incentive also decreases. Kreps
and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Ely,
Fudenberg and Levine (2004), and many others investigate the settings of a single
long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents { the long-run player tries to
commit to some type to achieve highest possible utility. Horner (2002) introduces
competition to keep high eorts sustainable.
The second is on statistical discrimination. Because agents cannot perfectly signal
their characteristics, the multiplicity of equilibria becomes possible as the possibility
of a dierential treatment of agents based on some observable characteristics. Cornell
and Welch (1996) develop a model on \screening discrimination" merely based on
\unfamiliarity", which makes it more dicult to make accurate assessments. Fang
(2001) shows that by allowing the rm to give preferential treatment to workers based
on some \cultural activity", the society can partially overcome the informational free-
riding problem. The critique on the statistical discrimination theory is that it is a
static theory, which does not say much about reputation formation and its persistence.
For the dynamic reputation model, Diamond (1989) constructs a model in debt
markets. His key point is that as time goes by, bad type drops out, which drives up
the reputation for the remaining agents.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and estab-
lishes the conditions for the possible steady states. Section 3 provides the dynamic
analysis and studies the eectiveness of one time anti-corruption policy. Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Settings
In this section, we develop a model in which there exist a benevolent government,
a group of social servants, and a large number of private agents. The benevolent
government selects and supervises social servants who delegate the government to
examine and approve some projects of the private agents by some criterion.
The civil servants could be the type of \good", \bad", or \opportunist", denoted
as type \G", \B", \BG" respectively. The good type \G" always rejects bribes and
implement fair tests. The bad type \B" always accepts bribes if there are any and
intentionally place obstacles during the tests if there is no bribe. And the opportunist
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type \BG" will weigh the advantage and disadvantage to decide whether to accept
bribes or intentionally place obstacles during the tests if there is no bribe. Because
the behavior for the type \G", \B" is xed, we only need to study the strategic
behavior of the \opportunist" type \BG".
If a civil servant accepts a bribe, there is probability  2 (0; 1) he will be de-
tected and removed from the oce by the government. If a civil servant intentionally
places obstacles during a test, there is probability  2 (0; 1) he will be detected and
removed from the oce by the government. Thus, there are two types of corruption
behavior for the civil servants: accepting bribes and dereliction of duty. And (; )
represents the supervision eort level of the government regarding to these two types
of corruption behavior.
The civil servants alive in date t remain in the economy in date t+1 with probabil-
ity  2 (0; 1). We assume that each quit is oset by the arrival of a new civil servant
selected by the government from a population with proportion of the three types \G",
\B", \BG": fG, fB, fBG. So the size of the civil servants remains constant.
At the beginning of each period, a number of private agents is selected by the
government to get their projects tested. Each private agent included in the tests will
decide to oer a bribe or not to the civil servant who is assigned to test his project.
Then the civil servants will decide to reject or accept bribes if there are any. If there
is no bribe, the civil servants will decide to implement fair tests or intentionally place
obstacles during the tests. The timing of the model in any arbitrary period t is
summarized in the gure below.
private agents 
offering bribes
or not
civil servants 
accepting or rejecting
bribes if there are any
civil servants 
implementing fair tests
or unfair tests
govenment
dedecting the corruption
behavior
test, dedection, and
quit results revealed
with payoff paid
Figure 1: Timing in period t
In period t, the expected utility of each private agent included in the tests from
oering a bribe and not oering a bribe are as follows:
U bt = PA;t[G(1  )X   C] + (1  PA;t)[GX   C]
Unt = PB;t[BX] + (1  PB;t)[GX]
where PA;t is the probability that the civil servant he meets will accept a bribe if there
is any; and PB;t is the probability that the civil servant he meets will intentionally
place obstacles during the test if there is no bribe.2 G is the probability of the
2fPA;t; PB;tg represents the group reputation of the civil servants in period t, which is the belief
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project being approved under a fair test. B is the probability of the project being
approved under an unfair test. X is benet from an approved project. C is the cost
of bribe.3  2 (0; 1) is the share of loss on a bribe if it is rejected.
The private agent will not oer a bribe at the beginning of period t if U bt  Unt .
That is,
PB;t[(G   B)X]  C + PA;t[(1  )C + GX] (1)
In period t, if there is a bribe, the utility of the \opportunist" type \BG" civil
servant from rejecting it and accepting it are as follows:
V Rt = Y + Vt+1
V At = Y + C + (1  )Vt+1    (PA;t)
where Y is the wage of the civil servant in each period.  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.
Vt+1 is the continuation payo in period t + 1.  (PA;t) is the cost from accepting a
bribe, which is a decreasing function of PA;t.
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So, the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant will reject bribes in period t if
V Rt  V At . That is,
Vt+1  C    (PA;t) (2)
The utility of the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant in period t from imple-
menting a fair test or intentionally placing obstacles during the test if there is no
bribe are as follows:
V Gt = Y + Vt+1
V Bt = Y + (1  )Vt+1
Since V Gt  V Bt , the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant will always implement
fair tests no matter the private agent oers bribes or not. The logic behind is that
even though the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants may accept bribes, they are
still not so \bad" as the bad type \B" civil servants are. They are not willing to harm
others while not benet themselves.
In this paper, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume
that the number of civil servants and private agents are so large that in each period the
pairs of the civil servants and private agents who have matched before are relatively
small. Thus, the eect of re-match could be omitted upon updating the private
of the private agents on the two types of corruption behavior of the civil servants: accepting bribes
and dereliction of duty.
3Here, we assume the size of bribe xed. Later, we may incorporate the endogenous size of bribe.
4We assume that the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant who accepts bribes will suer some
cost. It may be due to the secrecy of bribery behavior and mental burden of pursuing private gains
by using public oce. And this cost will decrease as accepting bribe becomes a general mood of the
society.
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agents' belief of the entire group of civil servants, which is the group reputation for
the entire group of civil servants.5 If indeed re-match occurs, then the private agent
in this re-match will update the belief on the civil servant in this re-match based
on the current group belief and the history record of this civil servant, which is the
individual reputation of this civil servant.
Now, we need to characterize the evolution of proportions of the three types of
civil servants as time goes by. Denote fG;t, fB;t, fBG;t as the fractions of \G", \B",
\BG" type of civil servants respectively in period t. Then ffB;t; fBG;t; fG;tg represents
the state of the economy in period t. In period t+1, the transition of the state of the
economy is described in the following three cases, depending on the actions chosen
by the private agents and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants in period t.
Case 1: private agents NOT oering bribes in period t
fG;t+1 = fG;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fG
fBG;t+1 = fBG;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fBG
fB;t+1 = (1  )fB;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fB
(3)
Case 2: private agents oering bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil
servants rejecting the bribes in period t
fG;t+1 = fG;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fG
fBG;t+1 = fBG;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fBG
fB;t+1 = (1  )fB;t + [(1  ) + fB;t]fB
(4)
Case 3: private agents oering bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil
servants accepting the bribes in period t
fG;t+1 = fG;t + [(1  ) + (fB;t + fBG;t)]fG
fBG;t+1 = (1  )fBG;t + [(1  ) + (fB;t + fBG;t)]fBG
fB;t+1 = (1  )fB;t + [(1  ) + (fB;t + fBG;t)]fB
(5)
Since only the \bad" type \B" civil servant will intentionally place obstacles during
the tests if there is no bribe, PB;t = fB;t. For the symmetric equilibrium, either only
the \bad" type \B" civil servant will accept bribes or both the \bad" type \B" civil
servant and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant will accept bribes if there are
any. That is to say, either PA;t = fB;t or PA;t = fB;t + fBG;t.
2.2 Steady States
In this section, we analyze the four possible steady states and their feasible conditions.
5In other words, the setting of our model is equivalent to the setting of a group of long-run players
and a sequence of short-run opponents.
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2.2.1 Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I)
The rst one is Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I), in which the private agents
do not oer bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants reject bribes if
there are any. By equation 3, we can derive the proportions of three types of civil
servants at LCSS-I, denoted as f IG, f
I
B, f
I
BG.
f IG =
1  + 
1  + (1  fB)fG
f IBG =
1  + 
1  + (1  fB)fBG
f IB =
1  
1  + (1  fB)fB
The utility for the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant at LCSS-I, denoted as
VL, is
VL = Y + VL =) VL = 1
1  Y
At LCSS-I, PB;t = PA;t = f
I
B. Back to inequality 1 and 2, to induce a private
agent not to oer a bribe and an \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant reject a bribe
if there is any, the following conditions must hold.
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-I:
(1  ) (f IB)  (1  )C   Y
f IB[(G   B)X]  C + f IB[(1  )C + GX]
2.2.2 Low Corruption Steady State II (LCSS-II)
The second steady state is Low Corruption Steady State II (LCSS-II), in which the
private agents do not oer bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants
accept bribes if there are any. By equation 3, we can derive the proportions of three
types of civil servants at LCSS-II. Because the private agents do not oer bribes, the
proportions of three types of civil servants at LCSS-II are same as the proportions of
three types of civil servants at LCSS-I.
Same logic, the utility for the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant at LCSS-II
is same as the utility for the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant at LCSS-I, VL.
At LCSS-II, PB;t = f
I
B, and PA;t = f
I
B + f
I
BG. Back to inequality 1 and 2, to
induce a private agent not to oer a bribe and an \opportunist" type \BG" civil
servant accept a bribe if there is any, the following conditions must hold.
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Feasible Conditions of LCSS-II:
(1  ) (f IB + f IBG) < (1  )C   Y
f IB[(G   B)X]  C + (f IB + f IBG)[(1  )C + GX]
2.2.3 Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III)
The third steady state is Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III), in which the
private agents oer bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants reject
bribes if there are any. By equation 3, we can derive the proportions of three types
of civil servants at LCSS-III, denoted as f IIIG , f
III
B , f
III
BG .
f IIIG =
1  + 
1  + (1  fB)fG
f IIIBG =
1  + 
1  + (1  fB)fBG
f IIIB =
1  
1  + (1  fB)fB
Due the the rejection of the bribe, the utility for the \opportunist" type \BG"
civil servant at LCSS-III is the same as the utility for the \opportunist" type \BG"
civil servant at LCSS-I and LCSS-II, VL.
At LCSS-III, PB;t = PA;t = f
III
B . Back to inequality 1 and 2, to induce a private
agent oer a bribe and an \opportunist" type \BG" civil servant reject a bribe if
there is any, the following conditions must hold.
Feasible Conditions of LCSS-III:
(1  ) (f IIIB )  (1  )C   Y
f IIIB [(G   B)X] > C + f IIIB [(1  )C + GX]
2.2.4 High Corruption Steady State (HCSS)
The last possible steady state is High Corruption Steady State (HCSS), in which the
private agents oer bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants accept
bribes if there are any. By equation 3, we can derive the proportions of three types
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of civil servants at HCSS, denoted as fG, fBG, fB.
fG =
1  + 
1  + (1  fB   fBG)fG
fBG =
1  
1  + (1  fB   fBG)fBG
fB =
1  
1  + (1  fB   fBG)fB
At HCSS, PB;t = fB, and PA;t = fBG+ fB. The utility for the \opportunist" type
\BG" civil servant at HCSS, denoted as VH , is
VH = Y+C    (fBG + fB) + (1  )VH
=) VH = 1
1  (1  )(Y + C    (fBG + fB))
Back to inequality 1 and 2, to induce a private agent to oer a bribe and an
\opportunist" type \BG" civil servant accept a bribe if there is any, the following
conditions must hold.
Feasible Conditions of HCSS:
(1  ) (fBG + fB) < (1  )C   Y
fB[(G   B)X] > C + (fBG + fB)[(1  )C + GX]
3 Dynamic Analysis and Anti-Corruption
In this section, we analyze the dynamical situation if the economy in period t is
currently at some arbitrary state: ffB;t; fBG;t; fG;tg. Then we discuss the eectiveness
of possible anti-corruption policies.
3.1 Dynamic Analysis
Proposition 1 Suppose in period t the economy is currently at some state:
ffB;t; fBG;t; fG;tg. There are only four possible areas of the state space.
Low corruption area I (L-I): in period t, private agents will not oer
bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will reject bribes if
there are any. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to
period t+ 1 follows equations 3.
Low corruption area II (L-II): in period t, private agents will not
oer bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will accept
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bribes if there are any. The transition of the state of the economy from
period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 3.
Low corruption area III (L-III): in period t, private agents will oer
bribes and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will reject bribes if
there are any. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to
period t+ 1 follows equations 4.
High corruption area (H): in period t, private agents will oer bribes
and the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will accept bribes if there
are any. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to period
t+ 1 follows equations 5.
i) If fB;t  minffB; f B g, fB;t 2 L-I.
ii) If fB < fB;t  f B , fB;t 2 L-III.
iii) If f B < fB;t  f B and fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), fB;t 2 L-I or L-II.
iv) If maxff B; f B g < fB;t and fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), fB;t 2 L-II or L-III.
v) If fB;t > f

B and fBG;t < f

BG(fB;t), fB;t 2 or L-III or H.
where f B; f

B ; f

BG(fB) are the solutions of the following equations.
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f B[(G   B)X] = C + f B[(1  )C + GX] (6)
(1  ) (f B ) = (1  )C   Y (7)
f BG(fB) =  
C
(1  )C + GX +
(G   B)X   [(1  )C + GX]
(1  )C + GX fB (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 sketches out the state space partition in the case of f B > f

B and (G  
B)X  [(1 )C+GX] > 0.7 Figure 3 sketches out the state space partition in the
case of fB  fB and (G B)X  [(1 )C+GX] > 0. Figure 4 sketches out the
state space partitions in the case of (G B)X  [(1 )C+GX]  0. In the last
case, both Low corruption area III (L-III) and High corruption area (H) disappear.8
6fB and f

B must be in between 0 and 1. If the solutions of equation 6 and/or equation 7 out of
this range, we say fB and/or f

B do not exist.
7Note, in this case, fBG(f

B) = 0. Thus, the extended line of f

BG(fB;t) will go through the point
(fB;t = f

B ; fBG;t = 0).
8In this case, fB is negative. Since the solution of equation 6 has negative solution, this means
private agents never oer bribes.
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0 1
1
fBG,t
fB,t
L-I L-III
L-II / L-III
fB* fB
**
fBG*(fB,t)
L-III / H
Figure 2: f B > f

B and (G   B)X   [(1  )C + GX] > 0
0 1
1
fBG,t
fB,t
L-I L-II / L-III
fB**
fBG*(fB,t)
fB*
L-III / H
L-I / L-II
Figure 3: f B  fB and (G   B)X   [(1  )C + GX] > 0
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0 1
1
fBG,t
fB,t
L-I
L-II
fB**
Figure 4: (G   B)X   [(1  )C + GX]  0
There are some more minor variations of the state space partitions depending on the
values of f B; f

B ; f

BG(fB). But the basic shapes are described as in gure 2 to 4.
After discussing the transition of the state in period t + 1, the natural extension
is to characterize the long run properties, that is, whether the economy can converge
to some steady state. From proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I) is feasible if ff IG; f IB; f IBGg is
in the Low corruption area I (L-I). Similarly, Low Corruption Steady State II (LCSS-
II) is feasible if ff IG; f IB; f IBGg is in the Low corruption area II (L-II); Low Corruption
Steady State III (LCSS-III) is feasible if ff IIIG ; f IIIB ; f IIIBGg is in the Low corruption
area III (L-III); High Corruption Steady State (HCSS) is feasible if ffG; fBG; fBg is
in the High corruption area (H).
Further, if a steady state is feasible and the economy is currently at some state in
the same area of this steady state, the economy will converge to this steady state.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the long run, if no steady state is feasible, then the state of the economy will
uctuate back and forth among these four possible areas of state space. Even in the
case that some steady state is feasible, the state of the economy may not converge to
it.
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For instance, suppose the state space partition is described in gure 1 and Low
Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I) is in the the Low corruption area III (L-III) and
Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III) is in the the Low corruption area I (L-I).
In period t, if ffB;t; fBG;t; fG;tg is in the Low corruption area I (L-I), the transition of
the state of the economy from period t to period t + 1 still follows equations 3 and
it will be on the path of converging to the Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I).
But once it crosses the boundary of the Low corruption area I (L-I) and goes into the
Low corruption area III (L-III), the transition of the state of the economy will follow
equations 4 and will be on the path of converging to the Low Corruption Steady
State III (LCSS-III) and go back to the Low corruption area I (L-I). The state of
the economy will uctuate back and forth between the Low corruption area I (L-I)
and the Low corruption area III (L-III). In this case, if High Corruption Steady State
(HCSS) is in the High corruption area (H), the state of the economy may not converge
to it even though it is feasible. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 In the long run, the state of the economy may not converge to any
steady state, even in the case that some steady state is feasible.
3.2 One Time Anti-Corruption
In this section, we assume that the economy currently suers from high level corrup-
tion, i.e., the economy is at the High Corruption Steady State (HCSS) or uctuating
in between the High corruption area (H) and some Low corruption area. The govern-
ment introduces a one time anti-corruption policy, aiming to lead to a low corruption
level permanently.
One time anti-corruption policy means a combination of new level of supervision
eort ft; tg in period t. And it only lasts one period. After period t, the supervision
eort goes back to the original level. We say a one time anti-corruption policy is
eective if after period t the economy converges to some Low Corruption Steady
State or uctuates in between some Low corruption areas.
Proposition 2 One time anti-corruption policy may or may not be eective depend-
ing on the environment of the economy.
i) In the case when there does not exist one time anti-corruption policy to eectively
turn around the high level corruption, the government must introduce a perma-
nent anti-corruption policy, i.e., permanently adjusting the level of supervision
eort.
ii) In the case when there exists one time anti corruption policy to eectively turn
around the high level corruption, when the government sets a one time anti-
corruption policy, not only does it have to increase the supervision eort on de-
tecting the bribery behavior (), but also it needs to consider the the supervision
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eort on detecting the behavior of intentionally placing obstacles (dereliction of
duty) during the test (). Anti-corruption should work along both lines.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Re-match
Since we assume that the number of civil servants and private agents are so large that
in each period the pairs of the civil servants and private agents who have matched
before are relatively small. Thus, the eect of re-match could be omitted upon updat-
ing the private agents' belief of the entire group of civil servants, which is the group
reputation for the entire group of civil servants as we have discussed so far.
If indeed re-match occurs, then the private agent in this re-match will update the
belief on the civil servant in this re-match based on the current group belief and the
history record of this civil servant, which is the individual reputation of this civil
servant.
For instance, if the the civil servant has rejected this private agent's bribe before,
the private agent will not oer a bribe because he knows that this civil servant is \G"
type. If the civil servant has intentionally placed obstacles during the test before, the
private agent knows that this civil servant is \B" type. He is more likely to oer a
bribe to keep this civil servant from intentionally placing obstacles during the test.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a group reputation model of corruption. Based solely on group
signals, we dene a player's group reputation as the belief that others have about
the characteristics of the player's group. A player's individual reputation is derived
from his group reputation by adding individual signals. Then a model of group
reputation of civil servants is constructed to characterize the strategic behavior of
potential bribers and civil servants. We analyze the four possible steady states and
their feasible conditions, provide dynamic analysis and study the eectiveness of one
time anti-corruption policy. We show that one time anti-corruption policy may or may
not be eective in successfully overturning the high corruption steady state depending
on the economic environment.
In the case when there does not exist one time anti-corruption policy to eectively
turn around the high level corruption, the government must introduce a permanent
anti-corruption policy, i.e., permanently adjusting the level of supervision eort. In
the case when there exists one time anti corruption policy to eectively turn around
the high level corruption, then when the government sets a one time anti-corruption
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policy, not only does it have to increase the supervision eort on detecting the bribery
behavior (), but also it needs to consider the the supervision eort on detecting the
behavior of intentionally placing obstacles (dereliction of duty) during the test ().
Anti-corruption should work along both lines.
Finally, we assume the eect of re-match could be omitted upon updating the
private agents' belief of the entire group of civil servants. This simplies the model
a lot. If we relax this assumption, we may get much richer dynamic scenarios on the
interactions between group reputation and individual reputation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
i) If fB;t  minffB; fB g, fB;t 2 L-I.
Since the continuation payo of the civil servants is bounded below by VL =
1
1 Y , if
fB;t  minffB; fB g, by equation 7, we have
Vt+1   1
1  Y = C    (f

B )  C    (fB;t)
By inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will
reject bribes if there are any.9 By equation 6, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X]  C + fB;t[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will not oer bribes. The transition of the state
of the economy from period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 3.
ii) If fB < fB;t  fB , fB;t 2 L-III.
Similar to the proof before, since the continuation payo of the civil servants is bounded
below by VL =
1
1 Y , if f

B < fB;t  fB , by equation 7 we have
Vt+1   1
1  Y = C    (f

B )  C    (fB;t)
By inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will
reject bribes if there are any.10
By equation 6, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X] > C + fB;t[(1  )C + GX]
9Similar to the multiple equilibria issue in the coordination game, there could be another equi-
librium, in which the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will accept bribes if there are any.
10Same as the multiple equilibria issue in the coordination game, there could be another equilib-
rium, in which the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will accept bribes if there are any.
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By inequality 1, private agents in period t will oer bribes. The transition of the state of
the economy from period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 4.
iii) If fB < fB;t  fB and fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), fB;t 2 L-I or L-II.
Since fB < fB;t, we do not have a denite answer whether the \opportunist" type \BG"
civil servants will accept or reject bribes in period t. There are two possible situations.
First, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is small such that
Vt+1 < C    (fB;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will
accept bribes if there are any. If fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), by equation 8, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X]  C + (fB;t + fBG;t)[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will not oer bribes. The transition of the state
of the economy from period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 3. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2
L-II.
Second, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is large such that
Vt+1  C    (fB;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will reject
bribes if there are any. If fB;t  fB, by equation 6, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X]  C + fB;t[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will not oer bribes. The transition of the state
of the economy from period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 3. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2
L-I.
iv) If maxffB; fB g < fB;t and fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), fB;t 2 L-II or L-III.
Similar to the proof before, since fB < fB;t, we do not have a denite answer whether
the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will accept or reject bribes in period t. There
are two possible situations.
First, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is small such that
Vt+1 < C    (fB;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will
accept bribes if there are any. If fBG;t  fBG(fB;t), by equation 8, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X]  C + (fB;t + fBG;t)[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will not oer bribes. The transition of the state
of the economy from period t to period t+ 1 follows equations 3. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2
L-II.
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Second, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is large such that
Vt+1  C    (fB;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will reject
bribes if there are any. If fB;t > f

B, by equation 6, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X] > C + fB;t[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will oer bribes. The transition of the state of
the economy from period t to period t + 1 follows equations 4. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2
L-III.
v) If fB;t > f

B and fBG;t < f

BG(fB;t), fB;t 2 L-III or H.
If fBG;t < f

BG(fB;t), by equation 8, we have
fB;t[(G   B)X] > C + (fB;t + fBG;t)[(1  )C + GX]
 C + fB;t[(1  )C + GX]
By inequality 1, private agents in period t will oer bribes.
Since fB < fB;t, we do not have a denite answer whether the \opportunist" type \BG"
civil servants will accept or reject bribes in period t. There are two possible situations.
First, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is small such that
Vt+1 < C    (fB;t + fBG;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will
accept bribes if there are any. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to
period t+ 1 follows equations 5. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2 H.
Second, if the continuation payo of the civil servants Vt+1 is large such that
Vt+1  C    (fB;t + fBG;t)
by inequality 2, this means in period t the \opportunist" type \BG" civil servants will reject
bribes if there are any. The transition of the state of the economy from period t to period
t+ 1 follows equations 4. Thus, in this case, fB;t 2 L-III.
Proof of Corollary 1
From section 2.2.1, we have ff IG; f IB; f IBGg. If Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I) is
in the the Low corruption area I (L-I), we can easily check that the feasible conditions of
Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I) described in section 2.2.1 are satised.
In L-I, the transition of the state of the economy follows equations 3. In period s + 1,
where s  t+ 1
fB;s+1 = (1  )fB;s + [(1  ) + fB;s]fB
= (1  )fB + [1  (1  fB)]fB;s
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Since [1   (1   fB)] < 1, fB;s+1 < fB;s if fB;s > f IB; fB;s+1 > fB;s if fB;s < f IB;
fB;s+1 = fB;s = f
I
B if fB;s = f
I
B. Thus, fB;s will converge to f
I
B. Once fB;s converges
to f IB, by equations 3, similarly fG;s and fBG;s will converge to f
I
G and f
I
BG respectively.
This means if a steady state is feasible and the economy is currently at some state in the
same area of this steady state, the economy is on the LCSS-I path and will monotonously
converge to LCSS-I.
Similarly, we can check the feasible conditions for all others steady states if they are in
the corresponding areas and the convergence property if the economy is at some state in
the same area of the state states.
Proof of Proposition 2
i) For instance, suppose the state space partition is described in gure 1 and all the
steady states are in the High corruption area (H). Thus, High Corruption Steady State
(HCSS) is feasible and no matter where the state of the economy is, the economy will
converge to High Corruption Steady State (HCSS). In this case, any one time anti-corruption
policy never works. It only can low the level of corruption for a period of time, then the
corruption level will increase back. The government must permanently adjust the level of
supervision eort to change the environment of the economy.
ii) For instance, suppose the state space partition is described in gure 1 without Low
corruption area II (L-II) and Low Corruption Steady State I (LCSS-I) is in the Low cor-
ruption area I (L-I), Low Corruption Steady State III (LCSS-III) and High Corruption
Steady State (HCSS) in the High corruption area (H). Thus, Low Corruption Steady State
I (LCSS-I) and High Corruption Steady State (HCSS) are feasible. If the the state of the
economy is in the Low corruption area I (L-I), it will converge to Low Corruption Steady
State I (LCSS-I). Otherwise, it will converge to High Corruption Steady State (HCSS).
Therefore, to let a one time anti-corruption policy in some period t eective, the state of
the economy in period t + 1 must be in the Low corruption area I (L-I), i.e., fB+1  fB,
where where fB are the solutions of the equation 6.
Suppose the economy is currently at HCSS, then the sucient condition to let the one
time anti-corruption successfully covert the economy from HCSS to LCSS-I is t  I and
t  I , where I ; I are the solutions of following equations.
fB[(G   B)X] = C + fB[(1  )C + IGX] (9)
fB;I = (1  )fB + [1  I (1  fB)]fB (10)
The logic is as follows. In current period t, fG;t = fG, fB;t = fB, fBG;t = fBG. To induce
the private agent not to oer bribe in period t and possibly go to LCSS-I, by inequality 1
we must have
fB[(G   B)X]  C + fB[(1  )C + tGX]
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From equation 9, we can solve I . Clearly, if t  I , above inequality will hold. Then
in period t+ 1, the supervision eort goes back to the original level.To let a one time anti-
corruption policy in some period t eective, the state of the economy in period t+ 1 must
be in the Low corruption area I (L-I), i.e., fB+1  fB, where where fB are the solutions of
the equation 6.
By equation 3, in period t+ 1
fB;t+1 = (1  t)fB + [tfB + (1  )(1  tfB)]fB
= (1  )fB + [1  t(1  fB)]fB
So, we must have
fB;I  (1  )fB + [1  t(1  fB)]fB
From equation 10, we can solve I . Clearly, if t  I , above inequality will hold.
Therefore, when the government sets a one time anti-corruption policy, not only does
it have to increase the supervision eort on detecting the bribery behavior (), but also
it needs to consider the the supervision eort on detecting the behavior of intentionally
placing obstacles (dereliction of duty) during the test (). Anti-corruption should work
along both lines.
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